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Short-term employment contracts have been deployed rapidly across 
European countries in the past decades. In this paper we suitably mod-
ify a known search and matching theoretical framework to quantify the 
effects of temporary contracts reforms on the present discounted value 
of the utility of junior and senior workers. We calibrate the model using 
data from Italy and find that while senior workers may benefit or not 
from the diffusion of temporary contracts depending on the productiv-
ity of the match, the utility of junior workers is always lower in the pres-
ence of temporary employment. This result is ascribable to the high 
rates of turnover associated with temporary contracts which offset the 
benefits of the increased labour market flexibility.
1 IntroductIon
High and persistent unemployment rates in Europe have often been associ-
ated with strong labour market rigidities and strict employment protection 
legislations (EPL). Particularly in Southern Europe, permanent contracts 
characterized by high hiring and firing costs, have represented for many 
decades the traditional way to hire workers. However, starting in the mid 
eighties, milder EPL short-term contracts were introduced and coexisted 
with the unchanged stricter EPL permanent contract, in an attempt to inject 
flexibility into the market, leading to the surge of dual labour economies 
(Saint-Paul, 1996). While the effects of this policy intervention have been 
studied theoretically for several macroeconomic variables, such as employ-
ment, unemployment, productivity, turnover (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-
Borrego, 2014; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; 
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Bertola, 1990; Bruegemann, 2007; Cabrales and Hopenhayn, 1997; Cahuc 
et al., 2012; Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Wasmer, 1999), the microeco-
nomic effects of such reform, specifically in terms of welfare, which are 
crucial to properly assess optimal policies toward short-term contracts reg-
ulations, remain largely unexplored. To address this important gap, this 
paper performs an income analysis to understand which categories of work-
ers benefited from the introduction of short-term contracts side by side with 
permanent contracts.
By imposing implicit and explicit costs on the ability of firms to ad-
just their workforce to optimal levels, rigid employment protection legis-
lation may limit efficient job separations and, indirectly, reduce efficient 
job creation (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). Even though, inefficiencies 
implied by job security provisions could be offset by wage adjustments, 
private payments or the design of efficient contracts (Lazear, 1990) wage 
rigidities and market imperfections may prevent these channels from work-
ing. By analysing firms’ dynamics in the presence of firing costs, Bentolila 
and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) show that the optimal strategy for 
firms is to reduce both hiring and firing, with an ambiguous effect on av-
erage employment over the business cycle. Regardless, stricter employment 
protection implies a slower speed of adjustment of employment towards its 
equilibrium level (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2001). Labour market equilib-
rium models such as Garibaldi (1998) and Mortensen (1999) come to similar 
conclusions about job mobility being negatively affected by EPL. Hence, 
theoretically the increased flexibility should improve market efficiency and 
workers should benefit from a dynamic labour market, brought about by 
flexibility-enhancing reforms. This occurs because in the process workers 
have greater opportunities to find jobs that better match their skills and 
needs and can more easily progress in their career and pay (OECD, 2013). 
However if the job turnover associated with temporary contracts becomes 
so high to offset the benefits of the increased tightness, workers who are 
predominantly hired on temporary contracts may be worse off. This is the 
issue that we want to investigate in this paper. To achieve this objective, we 
use Italy as a case-study since it is one of the European countries where the 
share and the variety of short-term contracts have increased significantly 
since the mid 1990s. The analysis of the changes registered in the labour 
market is the basis for developing a search model, with different types of 
contracts and heterogeneous agents. Calibrating the model, we are able to 
recreate working careers of different groups of workers and compute the 
present discounted value of their utility. One of our major findings is that 
for the case of Italy, on average, workers who randomly get a high produc-
tivity draw when turning senior face a substantial increase in income after 
the reforms. In contrast, junior workers as well as workers who experience a 
low productivity draw when turning senior are worse off.
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The Adverse Effects of Short-term Contracts on Young Workers 3
The theoretical basis of this study is a micro-founded search model in 
the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), where workers are heteroge-
neous with respect to productivity. We use a similar mechanism as in 
Blanchard and Landier (2002)(BL hereafter), however we characterize the 
model by including a number of additional features to study the impact of 
the reforms which lead to the surge of dual labour markets (Saint-Paul, 
1996) on the income of different categories of workers. We consider two la-
bour markets, one for junior workers, at the early stage of their working 
career and whose productivity is at the entry level, and one for senior work-
ers, who have already accumulated work experience and differ according to 
their productivity level. The presence of match-specific productivity allows 
workers in bad matches to experience better matches along their career 
path. To analyse the way the income of workers has changed after the intro-
duction of short-term contracts, we compare a benchmark pre-reforms 
model with a post-reforms model. The benchmark model describes an econ-
omy, characterized solely by permanent contracts, associated with firing 
costs to be paid by the employer in case of layoffs. This setting represents 
the case of Italy before the reforms, when temporary contracts were present 
but were so strictly regulated that their utilisation was very limited. In the 
model with short-term contracts, after the reforms, firms can choose to hire 
their workers on the existent and more rigid permanent contract or on the 
new more flexible short-term contract, which is characterized by zero firing 
costs at termination, and limited duration.1 Following the strategy of Cahuc 
et al. (2016) in modelling the trade-off between permanent and temporary 
contracts, we do not allow firms to dismiss temporary workers before the 
termination date.2 This is justified by the fact that while in the ‘Spanish 
regulation’ which covers Spain and Portugal, the rule for dismissals before 
the expiration date of temporary contracts is the same as for permanent 
contracts, in the ‘French type’ regulation, that prevails in Belgium, France, 
Greece, Italy and Germany, temporary contracts can not be terminated be-
fore their expiration date. Therefore, it is generally at least as costly to 
1These two factors propose a trade off which is known in the empirical literature (Guell and 
Petrongolo, 2007) and analysed in the theoretical work of Cahuc et al. (2016) and Varejão 
and Portugal (2009). The importance of this trade-off is justified by its antithetical re-
lated implications. If firms use short-term contracts as a screening device, higher pro-
ductivity is expected in the long-term since the objective is to find a better match 
(Nagypál, 2007). If they are used as a churning mechanism, they may instead cause a 
decrease in job stability, on the job training, and productivity growth (Blanchard and 
Landier, 2002). These features lead all types of workers to experience several sequences 
of short-term employment and unemployment during their working careers, as observed 
in the data.
2
2While in Cahuc et al. (2016) the length of the temporary contract is bargained over and fixed, 
in this paper we assume that temporary contracts terminate as a result of an idiosyn-
cratic shock, as in Faccini (2014).
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terminate a temporary contract before its date of termination as to termi-
nate a regular contract. The assumption which is present in most of the lit-
erature which assumes that it is costly to terminate permanent contracts, 
whereas temporary contracts can be terminated at no cost at any time, is 
not in line with the current regulations and it introduces a distortion in the 
explanation of how firms choose between permanent and temporary jobs.
By solving our model, in equilibrium we have that all junior workers 
are hired with the same contract type as they are homogeneous with respect 
to productivity, however there is scope for the utilisation of both contract 
types when hiring senior workers. We calibrate the model using data from 
Italy and we find that junior workers are worse off after the reforms as by 
getting hired on temporary contracts they experience higher turnover rates. 
Workers, whose random level of productivity is sufficiently high when they 
turn senior, enjoy higher wages and the benefits associated with perma-
nent contracts. Workers whose random draw of productivity is lower when 
turning senior, instead, fall into cycles of unemployment and short-term 
employment, facing lower salaries and reduced benefits. These results cru-
cially depend on the short-term contracts duration: as the average length 
gets longer the utility of junior workers increases in the scenario with short-
term contracts and the benefits of more flexibility overcome the costs. This 
is very relevant in a time in which there is evidence of short-term contracts 
getting on average significantly shorter (Cahuc et al., 2016; Charlot et al., 
2016).
This paper is related to the limited literature that studies theoretically 
the effects of short-term contracts on individual income. Cahuc et al. (2016) 
adopt a political economy approach to study the impact of the simultaneous 
utilization of high EPL and short-term contracts. After identifying the po-
litical support for these two instruments, they compute their effects on the 
economy’s total output and aggregate welfare. Using a similar framework, 
we depart from their setup by allowing for the ageing of individuals and 
therefore by focusing on the impact of high EPL and short-term contracts 
on different types of workers. By modelling short-term contracts as a mech-
anism to screen workers for permanent positions, Faccini (2014) shows that 
aggregate welfare gains derived from using temporary contracts as a screen-
ing device might be large. Even though both papers study the role of short-
term contracts within a search model, their objective is to study the effect 
on aggregate welfare and not on individual income by worker’s type which 
is the scope of this paper. The theoretical framework described by Casquel 
and Cunyat (2011) is conceptually very similar to the model presented in this 
paper, however they limit their study to the analysis of the different conver-
sion patterns of temporary contracts into permanent contracts. A recent 
empirical paper by Garcia-Perez et al. (2018) provides evidence that in Spain 
even though short-term contracts allow young workers to find employment 
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more rapidly, the long-run consequences are negative, as long-run employ-
ment and earnings prospects are worse.
The BL paper is the closest to this work. They use a search and match-
ing model to show that dual track reforms might have perverse effects on the 
labour market and specifically on the income of workers in France. Since 
young workers are the ones who are predominantly hired on temporary con-
tracts, the authors present evidence consistent with the model predictions 
for this category of workers. They show that the excess turnover generated 
by the reduction of firing costs associated with entry-level jobs in the case 
of France is high enough to offset the efficiency gains which derive from 
the higher flexibility. The mechanism that we adopt is similar, however, by 
extending their model in a number of dimensions we are able to quantify 
the effects of the reforms on the income of junior and senior workers in an 
environment in which permanent and short-term contracts coexist and are 
optimally chosen. First, the BL model is extended to include ageing of the 
workers, that is when the productivity of the junior worker is revealed the 
worker becomes senior. This allows us to compute the impact of the reforms 
on the lifetime income of both junior and senior workers. This mechanism 
is not present in the BL model as in their simple framework when the pro-
ductivity of the workers is revealed and they are not upgraded to a regular 
contract, they start again from an entry-level job with fixed productivity. 
Second, we model the reform as the availability of an additional contract 
type, the short-term contract, which coexists with the existing permanent 
contract and we allow firms to optimally choose between permanent and 
temporary contracts. In the BL setup, the modelling of the reform as a re-
duction of firing costs associated with entry-level jobs does not allow for any 
investigation of the trade-off between the two contract types and it limits 
the effect of the reform by assumption only to the transition from entry-level 
to regular jobs. Third, we also introduce endogenous separations for per-
manent jobs to allow the firing costs to play a role not only in the bargaining 
but also in the separation decision. Nevertheless, with the parametrisation 
used, regarding the specific effect of short-term contracts on the present 
discounted value of utility of junior workers, we are able to reach similar 
conclusions for the case of Italy. Moreover, the more general approach we 
adopt allows us to perform not only positive, but also normative analysis for 
policy recommendations.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide empirical 
evidence to assist us in designing the proper model specification. Section 3 
describes the search model, and Section 4 presents the calibration approach 
to test the model. Section 5 illustrates our findings regarding the change in 
income for different categories of workers and explores the outcome of some 
counterfactual exercises. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of future 
research.
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2 MotIvatIon
2.1 Changes in the Italian Labour Market Regulatory Framework
In Italy, since 1942 open ended contracts associated with quite rigid EPL 
and high firing costs represented the traditional legal instrument to hire 
workers. Short-term contracts were regulated in the early 60s. They share 
the same characteristics as the open-ended contracts, but for the limited 
duration established at stipulation (up to two years, with only one possibil-
ity of renewal). Due to strict rules for adoption, which limited significantly 
the scope for utilization, their percentage was small until the nineties. Only 
two other types of quasi substitute fixed-term contracts were available since 
the 70s: apprenticeship and Contratto di Formazione Lavoro (vocational 
training contract), which were specifically designed for young people.3
On the wave of liberalization of the European labour markets, in the 
past two decades many reforms have been approved in Italy to relax the 
rules for the utilization of fixed-term contracts and several new types of 
employment contracts (with fixed duration) have been legislated.4 
Specifically, three were the major reforms implemented with the objectives 
of improving labour market flexibility. The first reform known as Legge 
Treu was approved in 1997. It represents a milestone in the history of the 
recent Italian labour market. Some of the major innovations brought by 
Law-196/1997 are the regulation of agency contracts and collaboration con-
tracts and the relaxation of the rules for the utilization of fixed-term con-
tracts and apprenticeships. Few years later, with Law-368/2001, the Italian 
legal system by implementing a 1999 EU Directive removed the strict rules 
for adoption of short-term contracts and allowed firms to use short-term 
contracts under many different circumstances.5 Prior to 2001, the law regu-
lating short-term contracts provided a very specific list of circumstances 
under which firms could use those contracts, for example seasonal jobs or 
replacement of workers on sick leave. The new law liberalized the contract 
by abolishing the detailed list of specific occasions and allowing their utili-
zation for reasons of a technical, organizational, production or replacement 
nature. In 2003, Law-30/2003, known as Legge Biagi, introduced new addi-
tional forms of atypical contracts (such as job on call and job sharing) and 
several modifications to the vocational training contract. However, the 
3Together they represented less than 10% of the total number of contracts.
4See Tealdi (2011) for an extensive description of these reforms.
5According to some scholars (Aimo, 2006; Cappellari et al., 2012), the relaxation of these rules 
and the liberalization of short-term contracts created a sort of confusion among employ-
ers regarding the actual requirements for adoption. Specifically, it was not clear whether 
employers could use short-term contract also for activities which are not of temporary 
nature. Moreover, in case of court disputes, the applicability relied too much on the in-
terpretations of the judges, causing delays and disincentives for the adoption of the con-
tracts and therefore distorting the objective of the law.
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main novelty was the relaxation of the rules for the utilisation of apprentice-
ship contracts. Specifically, the age eligibility was extended and the possi-
bility to perform on the job training within the firm (instead of outsourcing 
it) was introduced. These changes were made in order to make the appren-
ticeship contract more flexible and therefore more appealing for firms.
As a result of the implementation of these reforms, the employment 
protection index associated with temporary contracts decreased signifi-
cantly (Figure 1a) and the share of short-term employment increased con-
siderably (Figure 1b), with strong effects on labour market outcomes and 
dynamics.
Hence, while fixed-term contracts were already present before the 
reforms, they were strictly regulated and their utilisation was rather lim-
ited. The implementation of the reforms and the liberalisation of these 
contracts provided firms with an additional instrument to hire workers.
2.2 Stylized Facts
We present a set of stylized empirical facts emerging from the analysis of 
OECD data on the Italian labour market in the period 1992–2015. Figure 2a 
shows that among individuals in the 15 to 24 age group the share of tempo-
rary employees is much higher compared to older age groups. Moreover, 
this share has been constantly increasing since the mid 90s and in 2015 it 
was approximately four times higher than twenty years earlier (Figure 2a).6 
The share of workers in temporary contracts among older age groups has 
increased as well, but of few percentage points. When we look at job tenure 
among young workers (15–24) we observe that the percentage of workers 
with tenure below one year has increased significantly (Figure 2b). 
Specifically, the share of workers with tenure below one month went from 
6Even before the 2009 crisis, the share was already three times higher than in the early 90s.
FIg. 1. EPL and Tempor ar y Cont r act s in It al y Source: OECD.
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approximately 2% in early 90s to more than 10% in the early 00s. In the 
same way, job tenure between one and six months increased by approxi-
mately eight percentage points. Overall, approximately 40% of the workers 
in the age group 15–24 have a job tenure below one year.
When looking at the unemployment rate by age groups (Figure 2c), we 
observe that since the early 90s, the unemployment rate among individuals 
aged 15 to 24 declined significantly up to 2009, when the economic crisis 
severely hit the Italian economy. Similar declining trends are observable for 
older cohorts, but the magnitude of the change is much more contained. If 
we focus on the duration of unemployment for the age group 15–24, we no-
tice that long-term unemployment (longer than one year) has significantly 
declined (Figure 2d), and has been replaced by short-term unemployment 
(below six months).
This evidence is in line with findings in the literature, which show 
that in Italy young workers have higher chances to be hired on a tempo-
rary basis, compared to workers in older age cohorts (Barbieri and Sestito, 
FIg. 2. Italian labour market statistics
Source: oEcd.
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2008). Specifically, it has been found that when individuals step for the first 
time into the labour market, they are very likely to start their career with 
a temporary contract (Barbieri and Scherer, 2009; Naticchioni et al., 2010; 
Schizzerotto, 2002). This phenomenon is particularly common among recent 
college graduates. Similar trends are also observed in other Mediterranean 
countries characterized by dual labour markets, such as Spain, France and 
Portugal (ILO and OECD, 2011).
Regarding the impact of temporary jobs on future career opportuni-
ties, studies have found that the probability of moving from a temporary 
to a permanent position increases with the duration of the contract (Guell 
and Petrongolo, 2007), but decreases with repeated temporary jobs and ca-
reer interruptions. In Italy the intermittent nature of temporary employ-
ment has been found to severely damage the career prospects of workers 
(Gagliarducci, 2005). This issue is particularly severe for certain categories 
of workers, such as school leavers, as they face an higher probability to be 
trapped in cycles of temporary contracts (Bruno et al., 2012). Similar results 
are found by Centeno and Novo (2012) for Portugal and by Bentolila, Cahuc 
et al. (2012) for Spain and France, who show that fixed-term contracts are 
positively associated with excess worker turnover. Nevertheless, evidence 
shows that the probability to transit to a permanent contract is higher for 
workers hired on temporary contract than for unemployed workers (Berton 
et al., 2007; Picchio, 2008).
Table 1 reports transition rates across different labour market states 
for the period 2007–8. It is interesting to notice that the transition rate from 
temporary to temporary employment is approximately 50% points across 
both age categories (16–30 and 16–64), while it is only 32% points from tem-
porary to permanent employment for young individuals and 26.5 across 
the entire population. When considering the transition from permanent 
tablE 1  
transItIon ratEs across labour MarkEt statEs
Transition to
Permanent Temporary Self-Employed Unemployed Inactive
Transition from
Age 16-30
Permanent 85.6 6.5 2.5 2.6 2.7
Temporary 31.6 49.8 3.9 6.8 7.9
Unemployed 10.2 18.0 8.5 31.1 32.2
Age 16–64
Permanent 90.8 2.1 1.5 1.5 4.0
Temporary 26.5 49.9 4.7 7.3 11.5
Unemployed 11.7 12.6 6.3 32.6 36.7
Source: Cappellari et al. (2012) using Labour Force Survey 2007–8.
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The Manchester School10
to temporary or from permanent to unemployed the transition rates are 
rather small across both age categories. These results point to the fact that 
the turnover associated with temporary contracts is much higher than the 
turnover associated with permanent contracts, in line with the evidence for 
France (Abowd et al., 1999).
Another important finding in the literature of temporary contracts, 
which has prompted research in the field, is the existence of wage differ-
entials between temporary and permanent workers. Using data from the 
European Structure of Earnings Survey and controlling for individual and 
job characteristics, Dias da Silva and Turrini (2015) find that workers on 
permanent contracts earn on average about 15% more than workers on 
fixed-term contracts with similar observable characteristics. Similar results 
are reported by Boeri (2011), Faccini (2014), Stancanelli (2002). Findings on 
the wage penalties for temporary workers have been reported also by Booth 
et al. (2002) for Britain and by Blanchard and Landier (2002) for France.
In summary, stylized facts and empirical evidence point at the fact that 
young workers are the ones who are more exposed to the diffusion of tem-
porary contracts. As a consequence, on one hand, they face higher turn-
over and earn lower wages, on the other hand they are more likely to find 
a job, so the duration of their unemployment spells is shorter. Depending 
on which of the two effects prevail, they might be better or worse off in the 
presence of temporary contracts.
In order to provide an answer to this open question, we use these 
stylized facts to develop a theoretical framework, described in the next 
section, to reconstruct the labour market dynamics before and after the 
reforms.
3 thE sEarch ModEl
In this section we design a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and 
matching model, based on the empirical evidence described above. To ana-
lyse the firms’ behaviour in response to the introduction of short-term con-
tracts, we enrich the Blanchard and Landier (2002) model with a number of 
features and compare an environment pre-reforms when only permanent 
contracts were accessible with an economy post-reforms, with the avail-
ability of both permanent and short-term contracts, and we allow firms 
to optimally choose the contract. The option for firms to offer short-term 
contracts, defined by a shorter duration and no firing costs at expiration, 
creates a meaningful trade-off (Varejão and Portugal, 2009). Moreover, to 
better model the choice between the two types of contracts and in line with 
the regulation and the literature (Cahuc et al., 2016), we do not allow for the 
dismissal of short-term employees before the contract expiration, but only 
for the upgrading to a permanent position.
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3.1 The Setup
The set-up is described by a set of equations, which defines the model dy-
namics. The economy is composed by a population of measure 1. Every 
instant a measure of individuals are born (k) and each instant the same 
measure of individuals pass away (at rate d). When the individuals are born, 
they are junior ( j) and they are out of the labour force. At rate m, which is 
the parameter of a Poisson arrival process, they join the labour force as 
unemployed and look for jobs. When they find a job, at rate μ, their pro-
ductivity is the entry-level productivity y0. However, a new productivity is 
drawn at rate λ, when a shock hits the worker-firm match and the workers’ 
productivity is revealed. They are now senior (s). The new productivity level 
y is specific to the worker-firm match and is drawn randomly from a dis-
tribution with cumulative distribution function H(y). Whenever the match 
is destroyed, and a new match is formed, a new productivity level is drawn. 
When senior, workers may decide to leave the labour force by retiring (at 
rate σ). We define b as the value of home production, e.g., unemployment 
benefits.
Firms hire both junior and senior workers.7 Firms without workers 
post vacancies at cost cp and they fill them with probability α, which is the 
parameter of a Poisson arrival process. In equilibrium, job creation is gov-
erned by profit maximization by taking into account expected revenues 
and costs of a new match. Firms and workers come together via a standard 
matching function M(u, v), where u is the measure of unemployment and v 
is the measure of vacancies. This function is twice differentiable, increas-
ing in its arguments, and exhibits constant returns to scale. The flow of 
matches for a vacancy may be defined as M(u, v)/v = α(θ), which is a de-
creasing function, where θ is the tightness of the labour market defined by 
v/u. The flow of matches for an unemployed worker may be defined as 
M(u, v)/u = μ(θ) ≡ θα(θ), which is an increasing function.8 Existing junior 
matches may terminate at Poisson rate δ as a consequence of an exogenous 
shock. When this happens, each party goes through a costly search process 
in order to meet its next partner. Existing senior matches may terminate 
endogenously as a consequence of an idiosyncratic match-specific produc-
tivity shock η. In this economy the two labour markets, one for the juniors 
and one for the seniors, are segmented with two different matching 
functions.
We assume that wages are set through an asymmetric Nash Bargaining 
process, where the bargaining parties are workers and employers. In this 
setup, β represents the bargaining power of the workers.
7This is socially desirable since we assume that the value of work production is always higher 
than home production, i.e., y0 > b.
8Standard Inada conditions apply.
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The Manchester School12
3.2 The Benchmark Model
In the basic set up, we assume that only permanent contracts are available 
and firing costs are to be paid by the firm in case of dismissal.9 Specifically, 
if the dismissal involves a junior worker the firing cost is F0, while if it in-
volves a senior workers the firing cost is F.
A sketch of the workers flows across status as implied by the bench-
mark model is reported in Figure 3.
3.2.1 The Firm’s Problem. When deciding whether to offer a permanent 
contract, the firm does not incur firing costs if the match is not formed, 
since firing costs are paid only when an ongoing relationship is severed. 
Therefore, the outside option is different whether the contract is new (N) or 
ongoing (O). Moreover, as the firing costs differ between junior and senior 
workers, the outside option is also different during the transition from jun-
ior to senior (R). When the firm posts a vacancy, the Bellman’s equations 
read: 
9Following standard practice in the literature it is assumed that dismissal costs are a pure 
resource waste, which occurs whenever a job is destroyed. As such, they can be consid-
ered as equivalent to a separation tax. Nevertheless, there is a growing literature on 
severance payments that avoids this assumption, see Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) 
among others.
FIg. 3. Model  Pr e-Ref or ms
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 where cp is the vacancy cost and α is the rate at which a vacancy in each 
market (junior and senior) is filled. In the market for senior workers, if the 
productivity level of the worker is not sufficiently high, it is not profitable 
for the firm to hire the worker and the firm prefers to keep the vacancy 
open. The threshold productivity level y∗ (reservation productivity) defines 
the minimum productivity level required by the firm to hire the worker from 
the market.
The firm’s Bellman’s equations for a filled position for junior and se-
nior workers are respectively: 
 
 
 
 Equation (3) is the expected present value of utility for a firm hiring a 
junior worker on a permanent position. The entry level productivity of the 
worker is y0 and the firm pays the junior worker wage wj. When the match 
is exogenously destroyed at rate δ, the firm is required to pay firing costs F0 
and it is left with a new vacancy. At rate λ the firm learns the worker’s pro-
ductivity level specific for the match. The productivity threshold y̌ defines 
the productivity level by which the firm is indifferent between keeping the 
worker within the workforce and laying the worker off during the transition 
from junior to senior. If the drawn productivity level of the worker is above 
the threshold (y ≥ y̌), the worker is upgraded to a permanent senior position 
(1)rJ
V
j
=−cp+훼j [J
E
j
−JV
j
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(2)rJ
V
s
=−cp+훼s ∫
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[
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s
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s
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s
]
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j
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j
−F0−J
E
j
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y
[
max (JR
s
(y), JV
s
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E
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s
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s
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s
−F )−JN
s
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]
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s
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s
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s
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]
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s
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(JR
s
). Otherwise (y < y̌), the firm pays firing costs F0 and opens a new va-
cancy. Equations (4)–(6) are the expected present value of profits from a 
new (N), transition (R), or ongoing (O) permanent position filled by a senior 
worker with productivity y. Each match may terminate endogenously as a 
consequence of an idiosyncratic match-specific productivity shock, if the 
new productivity level being drawn at rate η is too low, i.e., below the thresh-
old ŷ, or if the worker retires at rate σ. In the former case the firm pays firing 
costs F. Hence, the productivity threshold ŷ defines the productivity level by 
which the firm is indifferent between keeping the senior worker within the 
workforce and laying the worker off. In both situations, the firm is left with 
a new vacancy. The three Bellman’s equations differ only for the associated 
wages paid to the worker, as in each of the three scenario the outside option 
is different.
3.2.2 The Worker’s Value Functions. Let WE
j
 and WU
j
 denote the expected 
present value of utility of a junior worker currently employed or unem-
ployed, respectively. The present discounted values of the utility of unem-
ployed junior and senior workers satisfy the following equations: 
 
The first term on the right-hand side of both equation is the unemploy-
ment benefit, while the second term represents the probability to form a 
match with an employer times the change in the utility from unemployment 
to employment. In the market for senior workers (equation (8)), the worker 
gets the position whenever the productivity is above the equilibrium thresh-
old (y ≥ y∗). If the productivity is below the threshold (y < y∗), the worker 
remains unemployed.
The present discounted values of the utility of employed junior and 
senior workers read as: 
 
(7)rW
U
j
=b+휇j [W
E
j
−WU
j
],
(8)rW
U
s
=b+휇s ∫
y
y
[
max (WN
s
(y),WU
s
)−WU
s
]
dH .
(9)rW
E
j
=wj +훿[W
U
j
−WE
j
]+휆 ∫
y
y
[
max (WR
s
(y),WU
s
)−WE
j
]
dH ,
(10)
rWN
s
(y)=wN
s
(y)+휂 ∫
y
y
[
max (WO
s
(y�),WU
s
)−WN
s
(y)
]
dH +휎[WOLF
s
−WN
s
(y)],
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where 
The junior worker receives wage wj. The worker-firm match may be 
destroyed at rate δ as the worker becomes unemployed (equation (9)). In ad-
dition at rate λ the worker turns senior as a new productivity level is drawn: 
the worker can either move to a senior position (WR
s
) or join the unemploy-
ment pool (WU
s
), according to the productivity level of the match. The utility 
of senior workers on a permanent position varies according to whether the 
worker has been hired from the market (WN
s
) or she has been upgraded from 
a junior position (WR
s
) or she is on an ongoing permanent position (WO
s
), 
because of the different wages received. Nevertheless, in all these scenarios 
the match may be destroyed in two cases: if an idiosyncratic match-specific 
productivity shock hits the match (at rate η) and the new productivity level 
is below the threshold ŷ or if the worker retires, at rate σ. In the former case 
the worker joins the unemployment pool, in the latter case the worker exits 
the labour force (equations (10)–(12)).
3.2.3 Wage Determination and Equilibrium Conditions. We assume that 
wages are bargained using a Nash Bilateral Bargaining mechanism, where 
β represents the bargaining power of the workers. Wages are contingent on 
the productivity level of the worker. Therefore, wj is the wage of junior work-
ers, while there is a distribution of wages wi
s
(y) for senior workers, where 
i  ∈  {N, R, O}.
The sharing rules for the determination of the wages are described by 
the following equations: 
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s
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s
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s
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s
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s
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s
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rWOLF
j
=휋OLF
j
+m(WU
j
−WOLF
j
),
(r+d)WOLF
s
=휋OLF
s
.
(13)훽[J
E
j
−JV
j
]= (1−훽)[WE
j
−WU
j
],
(14)훽[J
N
s
(y)−JV
s
]= (1−훽)[WN
s
(y)−WU
s
].
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The termination of a match involving senior workers in ongoing re-
lationships implies the payment of firing costs F by the employer (equation 
16). Indeed, if the firm fails to agree to a continuation wage, its loss will be 
JO
s
(y)+F. This is not the case for senior workers in a new relationship (equa-
tion (14)) as the firm is not liable of paying firing costs if the match is not formed 
(Pissarides, 2000). However, for matches involving workers transiting from the 
status of junior to the status of senior (equation 15), the firm is required to pay 
firing costs F0 in case of no agreement and termination of the contract.
The free entry conditions imply that on both markets (for junior and 
senior workers) the values of the vacancies are equal to zero (JV
j
= 0 and 
JV
s
= 0).
In case of senior workers, we compute the job creation and job destruc-
tion productivity threshold levels for the optimal allocation of workers. y∗ is 
the job creation productivity level at which, when the firm meets the worker, 
the firm is indifferent whether to hire the worker or to keep the vacancy 
open. y̌ is the job productivity level at which during the transition from ju-
nior to senior, the firm is indifferent whether to keep the worker within the 
workforce or to fire the worker. Finally, ŷ is the job destruction productivity 
level at which the firm is indifferent whether to keep the senior worker on an 
ongoing relationship within the workforce or to fire the worker. 
 
 
We compute y∗ as the value of y for which the utility of a new filled po-
sition with a senior worker is equal to the utility of a vacancy (equation (17)). 
We compute y̌ by calculating the value of y for which the value of a transi-
tion filled position with a senior worker plus the firing cost F0 the firm needs 
to pay to fire the worker is equal to the value of a vacancy (equation (18)). 
Similarly, we compute ŷ by calculating the value of y for which the value of an 
ongoing filled position with a senior worker plus the firing cost the firm needs 
to pay to fire the worker is equal to the value of a vacancy (equation (19)). The 
job creation and job destruction equilibrium productivity thresholds read: 
(15)훽[J
R
s
(y)+F0−J
V
s
]= (1−훽)[WR
s
(y)−WU
s
].
(16)훽[J
O
s
(y)+F −JV
s
]= (1−훽)[WO
s
(y)−WU
s
].
(17)J
N
s
(y∗)=0,
(18)J
R
s
(y̌)+F0=0,
(19)J
O
s
(ŷ)+F =0.
(20)y
∗ = (r+𝜎)WU
s
−𝜎WOLF
s
+𝜂F −
𝜂
(r+𝜂+𝜎) ∫
y
ŷ
(y− ŷ), dH ,
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In addition, the equilibrium Nash wage equations for junior and senior 
workers read: 
 
 
 
As in Pissarides (2000), the firing costs enter with a negative sign (−βδF) 
in the wage equation for new matches (equation (24)) and with a positive sign 
(+β(r + σ)F) in the wage equation for ongoing matches (equation (26)). The 
negative sign associated with firing costs in the equation for new matches 
is explained by the fact that the firm is liable to the firing cost only if the 
worker hired from the market agrees to sign the contract. Hence, the firing 
cost F reduces the expected match surplus at the creation date and so re-
duces the initial wage for that reason. In the equation for ongoing matches 
the positive sign associated with firing costs is due to the fact that the firm 
now has to pay the firing cost if the worker does not agree to continue the 
match. Once the job is formed, the firing tax is an employer liability if the 
job is destroyed. This fact strengthens the worker’s hand in the wage bargain 
and so pushes the negotiated wage up for continuing workers (Mortensen 
and Pissarides, 2001).
3.3 The Model with Short-term Contracts
While in the BL theoretical framework the reform is simulated by analysing 
the outcome of a reduction in the firing cost F0, we model the reform in a 
more complex way by letting firms optimally choose between permanent 
(21)y̌= (r+𝜎)W
U
s
−𝜎WOLF
s
+𝜂F − (r+𝜂+𝜎)F0−
𝜂
(r+𝜂+𝜎) ∫
y
ŷ
(y− ŷ), dH ,
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s
− (r+𝜂+𝜎)F −
𝜂
(r+𝜂+𝜎) ∫
y
ŷ
(y− ŷ), dH .
(23)wj =𝛽y0−
(
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)
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− (1−𝛽)𝜆WU
s
,
(24)w
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s
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s
− (1−훽)휎WOLF
s
,
(25)w
R
s
(y)=훽y+훽(r+휂+휎)F0−훽휂F + (1−훽)(r+휎)W
U
s
− (1−훽)휎WOLF
s
,
(26)w
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s
(y)=훽y+훽(r+휎)F + (1−훽)(r+휎)WU
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− (1−훽)휎WOLF
s
.
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The Manchester School18
and short-term contracts. This new framework allows us to study the impact 
of the reforms which liberalised the utilisation of short-term contracts on 
the income of both junior and senior workers, in an economy in which both 
contract types coexist. The main features of the short-term contract are the 
ones that are standard in the literature (Cahuc et al., 2016): the exposure to 
a termination shock, which limits the duration of the contract, and the ab-
sence of firing costs at termination. Moreover, short-term employees can 
not be dismissed before the expiration of the contract, even though firms 
are allowed to upgrade the worker to a permanent position before the expi-
ration date.10
3.3.1 The Firm’s Problem. Let the superscripts P and T denote perma-
nent and temporary contracts, respectively. Keeping the same notation as 
described in Section 3, the Bellman’s equations for the firm hiring a junior 
worker read: 
 
 
The firm has the option to hire a junior unemployed worker on a per-
manent or short-term contract (equation (27)). The temporary contract 
(equation (28)) terminates naturally at rate τ without any firing costs to be 
paid by the firm. In case of a permanent contract (equation (29)), the worker- 
firm match can be exogenously terminated at rate δ, in which case the firm 
has to pay firing costs F. The trade-off is driven by the fact that on one side 
short-term contracts are limited in time and the search for a new worker is 
costly, however there are no firing costs to be paid by employers. On the 
other side, permanent contracts are open ended, but firing is costly. 
Moreover, by choosing to offer a permanent contract, whenever the produc-
tivity of the worker is revealed (at rate λ) and the worker turns senior, the 
firm is able to fire the worker by paying firing costs F. Let ŷ be the produc-
tivity level by which a firm, which is currently hiring a junior worker on a 
10This is justified by the fact that in Belgium, France, Greece, Germany and Italy, temporary 
contracts can not be terminated before the expiration date (‘French regulation’).
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permanent position is indifferent whether to keep the worker on a perma-
nent contract or to fire her by paying firing costs F, after the productivity 
level of the junior worker has been revealed (at rate λ). If the worker’s pro-
ductivity level turns out to be low, i.e., y < ŷ, the firm will pay firing costs F 
and will fire the worker; alternatively, if the worker’s productivity level turns 
out to be high, i.e., y ≥ ŷ, the firm will keep the worker on a permanent 
basis. With the temporary contract choice (equation (28)), when the produc-
tivity of the worker is revealed (at rate λ) and the worker turns senior, the 
firm can not dismiss the worker. Specifically, let ỹ be the productivity level 
by which a firm which is currently hiring a junior worker on a temporary 
position is indifferent whether to upgrade the worker on a permanent con-
tract or to keep the worker now senior on a temporary contract. If y ≥ ỹ the 
firm will upgrade the worker to a permanent position, while if y < ỹ the 
firm will keep the now senior worker on a short-term position. Hence, even 
in case of a very low productivity worker, the firm is forced to keep the 
worker within the workforce until the termination of the contract.11
The Bellman’s equations for the firm hiring a senior worker read: 
 
 
 
In the market for senior workers, when the productivity level is drawn, 
the firm decides whether to hire the worker and what type of contract to 
offer, according to the productivity level. Specifically, if y = ỹ the firm is 
indifferent whether to offer a permanent or a short-term contract, while if 
y = ÿ the firm is indifferent whether to offer a short-term contract or to 
keep the vacancy open. Moreover, the permanent match is destroyed en-
dogenously by paying firing costs F after an idiosyncratic match-specific 
11For the equilibrium with short-term contracts to exist, it is assumed that that the profit loss 
from a bad productivity draw cannot exceed the firing cost on permanent positions, F.
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productivity shock hits the match at rate η and a low productivity level is 
drawn (y < ŷ) or in case the worker retires at rate σ (equations (31) and (32)). 
A temporary contract (equation (33)) may only be terminated at expiration 
(at rate τ) at zero costs or due to the retirement of the worker (at rate σ).
3.3.2 The Worker’s Value Functions. From the workers’ point of view, we 
can define the value of being unemployed for junior and senior workers as: 
 
Equation (34) shows that junior unemployed individuals can be offered ei-
ther a permanent or a temporary contract when they meet a firm, depend-
ing on which of the two options is more profitable. When senior workers 
meet the firm and their productivity is drawn, they get a job offer with a 
permanent or short-term contract or no offer at all, according to the pro-
ductivity level.
The Bellman’s equations for employed junior and senior workers are: 
 
 
 
 
where 
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Equations (36) and (37) describe the present discount value of income for 
the two options available to the worker when in the junior phase of her 
working career. If the worker is offered a permanent contract, when her 
productivity is revealed (at rate λ) the worker might keep the permanent job 
or get fired. In addition, the worker might lose her job in case of an exog-
enous shock hitting the match (at rate δ). Alternatively, if offered a short-
term contract, when the productivity level is revealed (at rate λ), the worker 
could be employed as a senior temporary worker or get upgraded to a per-
manent contract. Nevertheless, her contract will naturally terminate at rate 
τ. The value functions of permanent senior workers hired on permanent 
contracts (equations (38) and (39)) present no major differences compared 
to the benchmark model.
3.3.3 Equilibrium Conditions and Wage Determination. In order to de-
rive the equilibrium values, first we compute the equilibrium wage levels 
for junior and senior workers, by maximizing the surplus of the employer-
employee matches: 
 
 
 
 
Equations (43) and (45) describe the wage of junior and senior work-
ers, respectively, on temporary contracts, equation (44) refers to the wage 
of junior workers on permanent contracts, while equations (46) and (47) 
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describe the wage of senior workers on new or ongoing permanent con-
tracts, respectively.
3.3.4 The Choice Between Permanent and Temporary Contracts. It is cru-
cial when computing the equilibrium to understand the decision of firms 
when offering a contract to junior workers. Since junior workers are homo-
geneous, i.e., they all have the same productivity y0, they will all be offered 
the same type of contract. Specifically, the firm will optimally choose to 
offer a short-term contract to junior workers whenever the value of offering 
a short-term contract to junior workers is higher than the value of offering 
them a permanent contract, that is whenever JT
j
> JP
j
.12 This optimal condi-
tion implies that 
Rearranging, we get that short-term contracts for junior workers are 
more profitable for firms than permanent contracts whenever: 
The trade off between permanent and temporary contracts is ascrib-
able to three main factors: (i) the different endogenous destruction rates 
when the worker becomes senior (at rate λ), (ii) the different exogenous de-
struction rates (the temporary match is terminated at rate τ versus a per-
manent match is destroyed at rate δ), and (iii) the firing costs to be paid 
when a permanent match is destroyed (either endogenously or exogenously). 
Equation (49) clearly points to the fact that all three elements play an im-
portant role in the initial decision of the firm. The first term on the LHS 
of equation (49) includes the different endogenous destruction rates when 
junior workers become senior, while the second term describes the different 
exogenous destruction rates. The term on the RHS of equation (49) includes 
12If it is optimal for the firm to offer a permanent contract to junior workers, the opportunity 
to offer a short-term contract will arise again only when the worker is senior. Therefore 
in equilibrium the share of short-term contracts would be minimal and would involve 
only senior workers. This hypothesis would rule out the screening device argument for 
the utilization of short-term contracts. Moreover, this is not observed in the data, which 
instead show a significant share of young individuals hired on a temporary basis.
(48)
(r+𝜆+𝛿)
[
y0−w
T
j
+𝜆 ∫ y
y
max
(
JNP
s
(y), JT
s
(y)
)
dH
]
> (r+𝜆+𝜏)
[
y0−w
T
j
+𝛽F
(
𝛿+𝜆 ∫ ŷ
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the firing cost, which enters with a negative sign. While the first LHS term 
could be both positive or negative depending on a number of parameters of 
the model, the second term depends on the termination rates τ and δ. Even 
though it is not possible to infer a priori whether the condition is satisfied, 
it is crucial to notice the important role played by the firing cost: for F that 
grows big the right hand side becomes more negative, that is, for sufficiently 
large F, equation (49) is always satisfied and the firm always hire junior 
workers on short-term contracts.
In order for equation (49) to be satisfied, the firing cost F needs to be 
sufficiently large (please see Appendix for further details), that is: 
It is interesting to notice that, for the case of equal exogenous destruc-
tion rates across contracts, i.e., τ = δ, substituting in equations (31) and (33), 
equation (51) simplifies to: 
where 휖 = −(r + 휎)WU
s
+ 휎WOLF
s
.
As analytically it is rather complicated, in what follows, we assume that 
this condition is satisfied, that is firms maximise their utility by choosing 
optimally to offer short-term contracts to junior workers. In the calibration 
exercise we will numerically verify that equation (50) is satisfied.
We then compute the two job creation optimal threshold levels for 
which the firm is indifferent between offering a permanent or a temporary 
contract (ỹ), and between offering a temporary or no contract (ÿ) when hir-
ing a senior worker. 
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(
𝛿+𝜆 ∫ ŷ
y
h(y), dy
)
+
𝜆(r+𝜆+𝜏)
[∫ y
ŷ
JNP
s
(y), dH(y)
]
(1−𝛽)(r+𝜆+𝜏)
(
𝛿+𝜆 ∫ ŷ
y
h(y), dy
) .
(51)F >
𝜆
{
(r+𝜏+𝜎) ∫ ŷ
ỹ
(y+𝜖), dH(y)− (r+𝜂+𝜎) ∫ ŷ
y
(y+𝜖), dH(y)
}
(r+𝜏+𝜎)(r+𝜂+𝜎)
[
(1−𝛽)(𝛿+𝜆 ∫ ỹ
y
h(y), dy)−𝛽𝜆𝜂 ∫ ŷ
ỹ
h(y), dy
] .
(52)J
NP
s
(ỹ)=JT
s
(ỹ),
(53)J
T
s
(ÿ)=0
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We also compute the job destruction productivity threshold for which 
the firm is indifferent whether to keep the worker on a permanent contract 
or to fire the worker (ŷ), whenever an idiosyncratic match-specific job de-
struction shock hits the permanent match, at rate η. 
Hence in equilibrium, the productivity thresholds read: 
 
 
3.4 The Economy Before and After the Reforms
The workers’ flows implied by the models before and after the reforms are 
reported in Figures 3 and 4. For junior workers, in equilibrium the main 
change between the two scenarios has to do with the type of contract they 
are hired on, which is chosen optimally in the post-reforms economy by the 
firm. In the pre-reforms economy, the junior worker is hired on a perma-
nent basis. Her contract may be hit by an exogenous job destruction shock 
(54)J
OP
s
(ŷ)+F =0
(55)ỹ= (r+𝜎)WUs −𝜎W
OLF
s
−
𝜂(r+𝜏+𝜎)
(𝜏−𝜂)
(
1
(r+𝜂+𝜎) ∫
y
ŷ
(y− ŷ) dH −F
)
,
(56)ÿ= (r+𝜎)W
U
s
−𝜎WOLF
s
,
(57)ŷ= (r+𝜎)W
U
s
−𝜎WOLF
s
− (r+𝜂+𝜎)F −
𝜂
(r+𝜂+𝜎) ∫
y
ŷ
(y− ŷ) dH .
FIg. 4. Model Post-Reforms
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at rate δ and she becomes unemployed or she may become senior at rate λ. 
In the post-reforms economy, the junior worker is hired on a temporary 
basis. Her contract may therefore terminate at rate τ (because of its limited 
duration) and she becomes unemployed or she may become senior at rate λ. 
The transition rate from junior to senior is unchanged before and after the 
reforms and happens at rate λ. Also the junior job seeker in the pre-reforms 
economy finds a job at rate 휇j and then at rate λ she transits to the senior 
market. This is the same after the reforms.
Senior workers are hired on permanent contracts before the reforms. 
They can get a job if the productivity levels drawn are high enough, ei-
ther after the productivity shock λ hits the match when they are still junior 
(y > y̌), or when hired from the unemployment pool (y > y∗). They can lose 
their job after the productivity shock η hits the match if y > ŷ and they 
can also retire at rate s. In the post-reforms economy, we observe for se-
nior workers the coexistence of both short-term and permanent contracts. 
Specifically, they can get a permanent job if the productivity levels drawn 
are high enough (y > ỹ), either after the productivity shock λ hits the match, 
or when hired from the unemployment pool. Alternatively, they can get a 
short-term job if the productivity level drawn after the productivity shock λ 
hits the match when they are still junior is low (y ≤ ỹ) or if the productivity 
level drawn when hired from the unemployment pool is in a medium range 
(ÿ < y < ỹ). They can lose their permanent job after the productivity shock 
η hits the match if y > ŷ and they can also retire at rate s. If hired on a short-
term job, they can loose their job at termination (at rate τ) and they can also 
retire at rate s.
3.5 The economy compared to Blanchard and Landier (2002)
The model pre-reforms is not very different from the BL model. Indeed, in 
our model, junior workers have fixed productivity, while the productivity 
level of senior workers is drawn by a distribution, in their model workers 
in entry-level jobs have fixed productivity, while the productivity level of 
workers in regular jobs is drawn by a distribution. In addition, entry-level 
jobs can be upgraded to regular jobs and are associated with lower firing 
costs, while regular jobs are open-ended and associated with higher firing 
costs. However, in our model workers age over time, so we distinguish be-
tween junior and senior workers (Figure 5). Moreover, in their model they 
do not allow for endogenous separations for workers hired on regular jobs, 
so the firing costs enter only in the bargaining and not in the separation 
decisions. Finally, they model the reform as a reduction in the firing cost 
associated with entry-level jobs. We depart from this modelling strategy and 
we model the reforms as the availability of an additional type of contract, 
i.e., the short-term contract. This setup is more general as, while in their 
model firms do not choose which contract to offer, but always hire workers 
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on entry-level jobs first, in our model firms optimally decide whether to 
hire workers (both junior and senior) on short-term or permanent contracts. 
This allows us to perform policy experiments to capture the effect of spe-
cific policy interventions related to the use of short-term versus permanent 
contracts. Hence, while their model is useful to perform a positive analysis, 
our model also allows for a normative investigation.
4 calIbratIon
Parameter values are selected so that the steady-state equilibrium of our 
model matches key labour market statistics of the Italian economy before 
the reforms (1990–5) and after the reforms (2004–8), assuming that one pe-
riod of time equals one month.
A summary of the parameter values and their source can be found in 
Table 2.
The discount factor r is set to match an annual interest rate of 5%, as 
reported by OECD. Following a common practice in the literature, we as-
sume a Cobb-Douglas matching technology of the form m(u, v) = hu휅v(1−휅), 
where h is the parameter which captures the overall efficiency of the match-
ing process and κ is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to 
unemployment. We calibrate the parameters of the matching technology 
according to the estimates of Peracchi and Viviano (2004). Specifically, we 
set the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment 
for junior workers to 0.17, which is the estimated value for the population 
aged 16–24. Then, we set the same parameter for senior workers to 0.31, as 
FIg. 5. Model of Blanchard and Landier (2002)
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the weighted average of the estimated values for the population aged 35–44 
and above 45. The mismatch parameter h is also calibrated as the average 
by population groups and is set equal to 0.273 and 0.17 for junior and senior 
workers, respectively.
We set the parameter which defines the bargaining power of the workers 
equal to 0.5, which is standard in the literature (Pissarides and Petrongolo, 
2001). The exogenous job destruction rate δ is set to 0.0085 as in Faccini 
(2014) to match a yearly job destruction rate of 10%, which is consistent with 
the values reported by Bertola and Rogerson (1997) for Italy as well as for 
other European countries. We will explore the robustness of this value in the 
sensitivity analysis reported in Section 5.2.
Although there are no direct estimates, in the literature firing costs in 
Mediterranean countries vary from six weeks of average revenue (Nagypál, 
2002) to 50% of annual income (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005) to one year and 
a half of average output (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). We follow Faccini 
tablE 2  
calIbratIon ParaMEtEr valuEs
Parameter Pre-reforms Source Post-reforms
r 0.004 OECD 0.004
hj 0.273 Peracchi and Viviano (2004) 0.273
hs 0.17 Peracchi and Viviano (2004) 0.17
휅j 0.17 Peracchi and Viviano (2004) 0.17
휅s 0.31 Peracchi and Viviano (2004) 0.31
β 0.5 Pissarides and Petrongolo (2001) 0.5
δ 0.0085 Bertola and Rogerson (1997), Faccini (2014) 0.0085
F 5 Boeri and Burda (2009), Faccini (2008) 5
F0 5 Boeri and Burda (2009), Faccini (2008) —
Garibaldi and Violante (2006)
λ 0.05 Blanchard and Landier (2002), Dolado et al. 
(2007)
0.05
τ — Lilla and Staffolani (2012) 0.1
cP 0.15 Boeri and Burda (2009), Djankov et al. (2002) 0.15
cT — Abowd and Kramarz (2003) 0
b 0.5 Dolado et al. (2007); OECD (2013) 0.5
휋OLF
j
0 Normalized 0
휋OLF
s
0 Normalized 0
y 0 Normalized 0
k 0.201 To match the % of junior workers in 
unemployment
0.201
m 0.024 To match the % of junior workers in 
employment
0.019
η 0.013 To match the % of senior workers in 
employment
0.013
σ 0.0036 To match the % of senior workers in 
unemployment
0.0028
y0 1.6 To match the wage of junior workers 1.6
y 2.6 To match the wage ratio of junior and senior 
workers
2.6
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(2008) and set the firing costs equal to 5, which correspond to a value be-
tween three and four months of the average salary observed in equilibrium, 
which is consistent with the value reported by the World Bank for Italy. We 
assume the cost is the same for junior and senior workers. This is in line also 
with the calibration of Boeri and Burda (2009) and corresponds to the levels 
of the pure tax component of employment protection legislation estimated 
by Garibaldi and Violante (2006) for Italy.
The monthly probability of a productivity change on an entry level job 
is set by Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Faccini (2008) to 10%. Dolado 
et al. (2007) set the quarterly probability of a productivity change to 2% and 
5% for more and less productive workers, respectively. We set the value of 
the parameter to a conservative level of 5%. The parameter τ, which rep-
resents the rate at which the contract exogenously terminates, is set equal to 
0.1. This value sets the average length of a contract between six and seven 
months, which lays in between the estimated average length of temporary 
contracts in Italy of eight months and the estimated average length of short-
term contracts only13 of four months (Lilla and Staffolani, 2012).
The vacancy cost, represented by the parameter c, is set equal to 0.15, 
which reflects typical estimates of total start-up costs as a percentage of 
income per capita by Djankov et al. (2002), converted to a fraction of la-
bour productivity using the average 1990s employment rate, as in Boeri and 
Burda (2009). We set the vacancy cost associated with short-term contracts 
to be zero, in line with the estimation by Abowd and Kramarz (2003) for 
France.
Next, we calibrate the parameter b of unemployment benefits. Selecting 
an appropriate value is quite controversial since b includes not only unem-
ployment benefits, but also other non measurable entities, such as the 
dis-utility of work, the home production, etc. Moreover, in Italy benefits are 
less generous compared to most European countries (Schindler, 2009).14 
Dolado et al. (2007) estimated the replacement ratio in Italy to be equal to 
0.2, OECD (2013) reports a replacement ratio of 0.2 for the years 1990–97 
and 0.34 for the years 1999–2003. We choose a value for b equal to 0.5 to 
match an average value of 0.35 and explore the robustness of this value in 
the sensitivity analysis reported in Section 5.2.
13Short-term contracts represent approximately 65% of all temporary contracts (Lilla and 
Staffolani, 2012).
14The Italian unemployment insurance (UI) system is complex and uneven. While ordinary 
UI benefits are initially relatively high, with a net replacement rate of 60 per cent, they 
drop to zero after 8 months (12 months for workers aged over 50), and complex eligibility 
rules imply that only few unemployed individuals actually receive such UI benefits 
(Demekas, 1995). In 2005, 2.3% of the labour force received UI benefits, about a third 
the rate in other EU countries.
© 2019 The Author. The Manchester School published by The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The Adverse Effects of Short-term Contracts on Young Workers 29
We select a uniform distribution for the function H(y) and set the lower 
bound of the distribution equal to 0. Finally, we normalize the flow of home 
production for junior and senior workers to zero (휋OLF
j
= 휋OLF
s
= 0).
The next six rows in Table 2 show the parameters set within the model 
to match the following moment conditions for the pre-reforms economy, 
which are obtained from the OECD statistics and social security data 
(Table 3)15: (1) an average share of junior workers (age 15–24) in employ-
ment in the period 1990–94 equal to 28.7%; (2) an average share of junior 
workers (age 15–24) in unemployment in the period 1990–94 equal to 
12.7%; (3) an average share of senior workers (age 25–64) in employment 
in the period 1990-1994 equal to 58.2%; (4) an average share of senior 
workers (age 25–64) in unemployment in the period 1990–94 equal to 
4.8%; (5) the average wage of junior workers (age 15–24) hired on perma-
nent contracts equal to 934 euro (6) a ratio of the average wage of junior 
(age 15–24) and senior workers (age 25–64) hired on permanent contracts 
equal to 0.70.
15We use the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) dataset as provided by Collegio Carlo 
Alberto (WHIP, 2005) for the years 1990–2004.
tablE 3  
labor MarkEt statIstIcs: data vErsus ModEl
Data Model
Pre-reforms Post-reforms Pre-reforms Post-reforms
Junior workers (Age 15–24)a
Employment 28.7% 26.2% 28.1% 24.9%
Unemployment 12.7% 8.2% 13.3% 9.7%
Out of labourforce 58.6% 65.6% 58.6% 65.4%
Senior workers (Age 25–64)a
Employment 58.2% 65.0% 58.8% 64.8%
Unemployment 4.8% 4.0% 4.7% 3.8%
Out of labourforce 37.0% 31.0% 36.5% 31.3%
Wagesb
Junior Perm. 934 – 951 –
Junior Temp. – 856 – 876
Senior Perm. 1335 1453 1394 1449
Senior Temp. – 1091 – 1012
Junior Perm./ Senior Perm.c 0.700 – 0.682 –
Junior Temp./ Senior Perm.d – 0.589 – 0.610
Senior Temp./ Senior Perm.e – 0.751 – 0.705
aSource: OECD. bMonthly wages in euros deflated using the CPI index as provided by the Italian Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT). Source: WHIP (2005). cCalculated as the ratio of the average wage of junior and 
senior workers hired on permanent contracts. dCalculated as the ratio of the average wage of junior work-
ers hired on temporary contracts and senior workers hired on permanent contracts. eCalculated as the 
ratio of the average wage of senior workers hired on temporary contracts and senior workers hired on 
permanent contracts.
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In the post-reforms economy, we used the same parameters as in the 
pre-reforms economy.16
The sensitivity analysis performed in Figure 7 explores the robustness 
of the results to changes in the most sensitive parameters (b, λ and δ).
5 FIndIngs
Using the parameter values described in Section 4, we compute the present 
discounted value of income for all workers before and after the reforms, 
represented by the workers’ value functions.
Let’s start with junior workers. We compare the present discounted 
value of the utility of a junior worker when employed before and after the 
reforms. Before the reforms an employed junior worker is employed perma-
nently and the worker-firm match she is part of is subject to an exogenous 
destruction rate δ. In the post-reforms economy the worker is hired short-
term and the match destruction is due to the contract termination, which 
happens at rate τ. According to our calibration, the match destruction rate is 
much higher in the second scenario (τ = 0.1 while δ = 0.0085) and therefore 
a junior worker after the reforms is significantly more exposed to cycles of 
employment and unemployment. When unemployed, the junior worker has 
more chances to find a job whenever short-term contracts are present: 38% 
16We can notice that the retirement rate turns out to be higher after the reforms to capture the 
lower percentage of senior workers out of the labour force. This can be explained by the 
fact that important pension reforms have been implemented in order to increase the age 
of retirement. According to the OECD Statistics, while the effective retirement rate for 
women has slightly declined from 59.7 to 59.4 in the decade 1995–2004, the effective re-
tirement rate for men has increased from 59.1 to 61.4. Numbers show the labour force 
participation has increased for the two oldest cohorts, 45–54 and 55–64 years old, be-
tween 2000 and 2008 proportionally to the increase of employment. Nevertheless, ro-
bustness exercises are provided in order to test for the relevance of this parameter.
FIg. 6. Lengt h of  Tempor ar y Cont r act s
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in the post reforms economy compared to 12% in the pre-reforms economy, 
according to our calibration. However, whenever a productivity shock hits 
the match and the worker becomes senior (at rate λ), junior workers face 
different perspectives before and after the reforms. In the pre-reforms econ-
omy, the worker can be offered a permanent position with 61% probability 
or become unemployed with 39% probability. In the post-reforms economy, 
the worker may be offered a permanent position, with 58% probability or 
might keep a contract of temporary nature with 42% probability.
We then compute the present discounted value of the utility of junior 
workers (WE
j
 and WT
j
), and we find lower values in the scenario with short-
term contracts. This is due to the fact that the (quite) short duration of 
temporary contracts causes junior workers to experience several cycles of 
temporary employment and unemployment before getting senior; and even 
though the probability to find a new job when unemployed is much higher 
post-reforms, this is probably not enough to compensate for the loss due 
to the higher turnover. Moreover, upon turning senior, junior workers face 
a lower chance to get a permanent position and have to go through some 
cycles of short-term employment before getting a productivity draw high 
enough to be offered a permanent job. Therefore, even though the wage 
level is only slightly lower post-reforms, we find that junior workers are 
worse off in the scenario with temporary contracts.
This result is heavily dependent on the length of the short-term con-
tract. In order to understand how much our results depend on the the ter-
mination rate of the short-term contracts and therefore on their length, we 
compute the present discounted value of the utility for different values of 
the parameter τ. Specifically, we consider a range of values for the termina-
tion shock τ corresponding to a contract length varying from 3 months to 16 
months (Figure 6). In the calibration exercise we use a value of τ equal to 0.1, 
which corresponds to the average duration of short-term contracts in Italy 
of approximately 6.5 months.
FIg. 7. Sensit ivit y Anal ysis
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Interestingly, we observe that the present discounted value of the utility 
of junior workers increases substantially for junior workers as the length 
of the contract gets longer. This result is not surprising: whenever a young 
worker incurs in a job loss because of contract expiration (at rate τ), the 
worker is still junior; hence, the worker’s career will include a period of un-
employment until another job offer arrives with the same characteristics: a 
new short-term contract with the same salary. Therefore, the loss in utility 
is ascribable to the period that the worker spends in unemployment with a 
lower income (unemployment benefits). The shorter the contract, the higher 
is the probability that the worker will experience this loss multiple times. 
However, as the contract gets longer, the gain from the increased labour 
market flexibility may overcome the loss due to the higher turnover, in-
creasing the income of junior workers. In the scenario in which the length of 
short-term contracts is longer than 10 months, the present discounted value 
of utility is higher in the presence of short-term contracts. This result is par-
ticularly interesting as there is evidence of short-term contracts becoming 
shorter and shorter (Cahuc et al., 2016; Charlot et al., 2016) and according to 
our model this might further reduce the income of junior workers.
When considering high productivity senior workers, i.e., those work-
ers whose randomly drawn productivity level when turning senior is high 
enough that they would have been hired permanently both before and after 
the reforms, we find that they are better off in the economy with short-
term contracts (Table 4). This is partly due to the fact that they stay lon-
ger in the labour force as the parameter associated with retirement is lower 
and partly due to the higher salary they enjoy in the post-reforms economy. 
To disentangle the two effects, we perform a counter-factual exercise. We 
compute the present discounted value of the utility using the same value of 
the retirement parameter as in the pre-reforms economy, and we find that 
senior workers are still better off in the presence of short-term contracts, 
but the gap is smaller (Table 5). Next, we compute the present discounted 
tablE 4  
PrEsEnt dIscountEd valuE oF IncoME by WorkEr’s tyPEs
Pre-reforms Post-reforms % change
Utility when employed
Junior (JE
j
) 152.9 149.7 −2.1%
Senior More productive
ongoing (JO
s
 ) 161.2 182.9 +12.3%
transiting (JR
s
 ) 155.7
new (JN
s
 ) 149.9 180.2 +20.0%
Senior Less productive (JT
s
) 146.2
Utility when unemployed
Junior (JU
j
) 152.0 149.5 −1.6%
Senior (JU
s
) 148.5 176.3 +18.9%
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value of the utility considering the same salary as they would have earned in 
an economy without short-term contracts, and again we find that they are 
still better off in the post-reforms economy, even though the gap is smaller 
(Table 6).
When considering less productive workers, i.e., those workers whose 
drawn productivity level when turning senior is such that they would have 
been hired permanently before the reforms and short-term in the post-re-
forms economy, we find that they are worse off in the second scenario. Not 
only the destruction rate of their match is higher due to the short-term nature 
of their contract (𝜏 > 𝜂H(ŷ)), but also their wage level is lower. Therefore, 
the present discounted value of their utility is lower. In order to disentangle 
the wage effect from the turnover component, we perform the same count-
er-factual exercise as for senior more productive workers. We replace the 
wages post-reforms with the same wages workers would have earned before 
the reforms. The aim of this exercise is to understand whether it is the lower 
wage associated with short-term contracts, which determines the results or 
the findings are due to the nature of the short-term contracts itself. The 
results of this exercise are shown in Table 6. We obtain interesting findings: 
workers hired short-term still face lower income after the reforms. We in-
terpret this result as evidence that it is not only the lower wages associated 
with short-term contracts for senior workers which lead to lower income 
post-reforms, but the high turnover associated with this type of contracts 
significantly reduced their well-being.
In summary, we conclude that junior workers are worse off after the 
reforms. Workers who end up in a good match when they turn senior are 
better off after the reforms due to lower retirement rates and higher salaries, 
while workers who end up in a bad match at the time of the transition to se-
niority, face a reduction in the present discount value of income when short-
term contracts are present. In addition, the length of short-term contracts 
is a rather important element affecting the workers’ income: for short-term 
tablE 5  
countErFactual ExErcIsE: saME rEtIrEMEnt ratE (σ) bEForE and aFtEr thE rEForMs
Pre-reforms Post-reforms % change
Utility when employed
Junior (JE
j
) 152.9 148.5 −2.9%
Senior More productive
ongoing (JO
s
 ) 162.8 178.6 +9.7%
transiting (JR
s
 ) 155.7
new (JN
s
 ) 150.1 173.5 +15.6%
Senior Less productive (JT
s
) 146.6
Utility when unemployed
Junior (JU
j
) 152.0 148.2 −2.5%
Senior (JU
s
) 148.2 168.3 +13.6%
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contracts of very short duration junior workers are better off in the pre-re-
forms economy, while for contracts longer than 18 months, the opposite is 
true (see Table 7).
5.1 Alternative modelling of the reforms à la Blanchard and Landier (2002)
As in Blanchard and Landier (2002), we could have alternatively modelled 
the reforms by quantifying the impact of the reduction of firing costs F0 for 
junior workers within the benchmark model setup. Even though this choice 
would not have allowed us to analyse the choice faced by firms between 
short-term contracts and permanent contracts, it is interesting to compare 
the results. Let’s therefore assume that in the benchmark model the firing 
costs for junior workers F0 are now reduced to zero, while firing costs F as-
sociated with permanent employees are kept at the same value. We compute 
the present discounted value of the income of both categories of workers 
in this scenario. We find a negative impact of the reforms on the present 
discounted value of income of junior workers, confirming the BL results. In 
tablE 6  
countEr-Factual ExErcIsE: saME WagE bEForE and aFtEr thE rEForMs
Pre-reforms Post-reforms % change
Utility when employed
Junior (JE
j
) 152.9 147.5 −3.5%
Senior More productive
ongoing (JO
s
 ) 162.8 168.1 +3.3%
transiting (JR
s
 ) 155.7
new (JN
s
 ) 150.1 156.6 +4.3%
Senior Less productive (JT
s
) 147.7
Utility when unemployed
Junior (JU
j
) 152.0 149.3 −1.8%
Senior (JU
s
) 148.2 155.2 +4.7%
tablE 7  
altErnatIvE ModEllIng oF thE rEForMs: a rEductIon In FIrIng costs For JunIor 
WorkErs
Pre-reforms Post-reforms % change
Utility when employed
Junior (JE
j
) 152.9 150.6 −1.5%
Senior More productive
ongoing (JO
s
 ) 162.8 162.1 −0.4%
transiting (JR
s
 ) 155.7 149.6 −3.9%
new (JN
s
 ) 150.1 148.7 −0.9%
Senior Less productive (JT
s
) 147.7 147.5 −0.1%
Utility when unemployed
Junior (JU
j
) 152.0 149.8 −1.4%
Senior (JU
s
) 148.2 147.4 −0.5%
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fact, due to lower firing costs, on one hand the probability to find a job is 
higher, on the other hand firms fire more junior workers when the produc-
tivity is revealed, increasing the turnover. As this second effects prevails, 
junior workers are worse off after the reforms, confirming the findings ob-
tained using the model with short-term contracts. The magnitude of the 
change is similar in both approaches: in fact, according to this modelling 
approach, the income of junior workers is down by 1.5% after the reforms, 
compared to a decline of 2.1% as obtained using the model with short-term 
contracts. The slight smaller effect in the former may be due to the fact that 
with this modelling strategy firms do not have choices regarding the type of 
contracts to use when hiring junior workers. In the model with short-term 
contracts, instead, firms have a trade-off: they can use the traditional per-
manent contract which is open-ended and associated with firing costs or 
the short-term contract, which has limited duration, but no firing costs. As 
in equilibrium firms optimally choose to use short-term contracts, and as 
according to our calibration, turnover is higher with short-term contracts, 
the impact of the reforms is stronger. However, when we perturb other key 
policy parameters in dual labour economies such as Southern European 
countries, for instance the short-term contract termination rate (τ), we get 
interesting results with our model, while no insights from the BL model 
(Figure 6). In the BL model in fact, the length of the entry-level job is de-
termined by the same shock that defines the transition to a regular job. In 
our model, we disentangle the two shocks in order to separately analyse the 
impact of each of them on the junior income. Hence, compared to the BL 
framework, our model has the potential of providing more normative in-
sights in terms of policy recommendations related to specific features of the 
short-term contract and to crucial parameters affecting the choice between 
permanent and short-term contracts.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
We analyse in this section the robustness of the results to perturbations of 
key parameters. In the left panel of Figure 7 we report the utility of junior 
workers pre and post-reforms as a function of the unemployment benefit b. 
We observe that the present discounted value of the utility is always higher 
pre-reforms, and as expected both values increase as the unemployment 
benefit increases. In addition, we can notice that as b increases, the utility 
post-reforms tends to converge to the one pre-reforms.
Then, we consider the perturbation of the parameter reflecting the rate 
at which the productivity of a junior worker is revealed, λ. We allow the pa-
rameter to vary in a range from 0.01 to 0.09. The change in the parameter’s 
value affects junior workers pre-reforms and post-reforms. In the middle 
panel of Figure 7, the graph shows that as λ increases, the utility of junior 
workers is higher in the pre-reforms economy, confirming the robustness of 
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our results to perturbation of the λ parameter. As λ increases the utilities in 
the two economies converge.
Finally, we perturb the parameters associated with the exogenous de-
struction rate, δ. The change in the parameter’s value affects directly junior 
workers in the pre-reforms economy. The right panel in Figure 7 shows that 
the utility is higher pre-reforms, however as δ increases, the utility of junior 
workers before and after the reforms converge.
In summary, we can conclude that our results are robust to the pertur-
bation of the model key parameters and the present discounted value of the 
utility of junior workers is higher in the pre-reforms economy when tempo-
rary contracts are not present.
6 conclusIons and dIscussIon
In this paper we quantify the effect of the introduction of short-term em-
ployment contracts in the labour market on the utility of different catego-
ries of workers. We suitably modify the search and matching framework 
developed by Blanchard and Landier (2002) in several directions to com-
pute the present discounted value of the utility of junior and senior work-
ers. Specifically, we allow for the ageing of the workers, for the endogenous 
separations of senior workers, and we model the reform as the availability 
of an additional contract type, i.e., the short-term contract, and we let the 
firms optimally choose the most profitable option. Then, we compare the 
working careers of both types of individuals before the reforms, when only 
permanent contracts are available, and after the reforms, when permanent 
and short-term contracts coexist.
We perform the calibration of the model using data from Italy in order 
to quantify the income change due to the implementation of the reforms. 
We find that junior workers are worse off in the economy with temporary 
contracts. Even though the probability to find a job when they are unem-
ployed is higher after the reforms, due to the higher market tightness, the 
short-term length of the contract they are hired on leads to a much higher 
turnover rate and lower present discounted value of the utility. That is, the 
higher labour market flexibility does not compensate for the increased fre-
quency of cycles of employment and unemployment. Senior workers who 
would have been hired on a permanent contract before and after the re-
forms, are better off in the second scenario as they have higher chances to 
find a new job when their match is hit by an endogenous destruction shock 
and they enjoy a higher salary. Finally, senior workers who would have been 
hired on a permanent basis before the reforms but on a temporary basis in 
the post-reforms economy, fare worse, as they experience high rates of turn-
over and a wage reduction.
Finally, we find that the length of the short-term contract is a cru-
cial determinant of the utility of junior workers: the longer the temporary 
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contracts, the higher the present discounted value of their utility. This result 
has important policy implications in a time in which the length of tempo-
rary contracts is getting significantly shorter (Charlot et al., 2016).
Next step in our research agenda is to study the effect on the utility of 
junior workers of the new labour market reform, which has been recently 
implemented in Italy, which introduces a unique open-ended contract with 
increasing firing costs with tenure, as suggested by several economists in 
Europe (Bentolila, Jimeno et al., 2012; Boeri et al., 2012; Lepage-Saucier 
et al., 2013; Saint-Paul, 1996).
aPPEndIx
A.1 Optimal Choice of Permanent Versus Temporary Contracts for Junior 
Workers
In order for firms to choose which contract to offer to junior workers, they 
need to compare the gain from offering a short-term contract versus a per-
manent contract, that is they compare the value function associated with 
the two contract types and offer a temporary contract whenever: 
that is whenever 
is greater than 
Knowing the wage of junior workers under the two circumstances: 
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 Hence, firms prefer to offer short-term contracts to junior workers 
whenever: 
where 
 
Rearranging, we get that short-term contracts for junior workers are 
more profitable for firms than permanent contracts whenever: 
The trade off between permanent and temporary contracts is given by 
three main factors: (i) the different options available when a junior worker 
becomes senior (first term on the LHS of equation (67)), (ii) the different 
exogenous destruction rate (second term on the LHS of equation (67)) and 
(iii) the firing costs to be paid when a permanent match is destroyed, either 
endogenously or exogenously (the RHS of equation (67)).
The above equation is satisfied whenever the firing cost is sufficiently 
large, that is: 
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y
h(y), dy
)
+ 𝜆 ∫ y
y
max (JNP
s
(y),−F ) dH −𝛿F
]
.
(65)J
NP
s
(y)=
(1−훽)(y− (r+휎)WU
s
+휎WOLF
s
)+훽휂F
r+휂+휎
,
(66)J
T
s
(y)=
(1−훽)(y− (r+휎)WU
s
+휎WOLF
s
)
r+휏+휎
.
(67)
𝜆
{
(r+𝜆+𝛿)
[∫ ŷ
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It is interesting to notice that, for τ = δ, which is whenever the exoge-
nous destruction rate is equal for both permanent and temporary contracts, 
equation (68) simplifies to: 
Equation (69) highlights the fact that whenever the firing cost is higher 
than the difference between the value of the future opportunities for junior 
workers turning senior under short-term versus permanent contracts, dis-
counted by the rate at which the permanent contract terminates, the firm 
would optimally choose to offer short-term contracts to junior workers.
Substituting in for the value function of senior workers, we get: 
where 휖 = −(r + 휎)WU
s
+ 휎WOLF
s
.
A.2 Model Extension: Upgrading of Senior Temporary Workers
The model with short-term contracts can be extended by allowing senior 
workers hired on temporary contracts the possibility to be upgraded to a 
permanent position. This implies that the value functions for firms and 
workers respectively read: 
 
A match-specific productivity shock hits the match at rate η and if 
the new productivity draw is higher than the productivity threshold ỹ, the 
worker will be upgraded to a permanent position, otherwise the worker will 
keep the temporary job.
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ỹ
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By solving the model, we get the following productivity thresholds: 
 
 
We calibrate this version of the model using the same parameters de-
scribed in Section 4. Even in this case we are able to match fairly well the 
statistics reported in Table 3 and we get similar results. Table 8 shows that 
the utility of junior workers is lower after the reforms by approximately 3 
percentage points both when employed and unemployed. Senior workers 
are better off if the productivity of the match is high, while if the match 
productivity is low, they fare worse.
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ŷ
(1−𝛽)(y−ŷ)
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